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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal from a final judgment of the Fourth District Court
was brought pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

The final judgment was entered on September 21, 1992.

(R. 370-71) Defendants' notice of appeal and undertaking on appeal
were timely filed on September 28, 1992, (R. 372-77), within the
thirty days allowed by Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
The appeal was filed with the Supreme Court, pursuant to its
appellate jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and decrees of any
court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction," set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 782-2(3)(j) (1992).

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1991),

this appeal was poured over to the Court of Appeals on November 17,
1992. (R. 383)
STATEMENT OP ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in enforcing plaintiff's proposed

settlement agreement when:
a.

Its specific terms were never proposed nor agreed to by

defendants?
b.

It had not been previously filed with the court or

entered upon the minutes of the court as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-51-32

(1992) and Rule 4-504(8) of the Code of Judicial

Administration?
2.

If the settlement agreement is a valid contract, is it

voidable as a consequence of counsel's unilateral mistake of fact?

3.

If an agreement existed, did the trial court err in summarily

enforcing it because its terms are ambiguous?
Standard of Review;
To the extent that the issues of this appeal involve a factual
finding of the trial court, although the court did not appear to
engage in any fact finding, a trial court's findings of fact will
not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.

State v,

Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a).

"Findings are clearly erroneous only when they are against

the clear weight of the evidence or when the appellate court is
convinced that a mistake has been made." Id.

Further,

[t]o show clear error in a finding of fact, the
challenging party must marshal all evidence supporting
the finding, and show that the finding is nevertheless
against the great weight of the evidence. Additionally,
due regard must be given to the trial court's ability to
judge the credibility of witnesses.
Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(citations omitted).
To the extent that the issues involve the trial court's
conclusions of law, this Court may review the trial court's
conclusions for correctness, affording them no deference.

Tanner

v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In general, settlement agreements are favored by the law
because of the obvious benefits to both the parties and the
judicial system.

Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead,

592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979).

It is also well established that a

settlement agreement may be summarily enforced by a motion in the
2

court of the original action.

Id.

Utah Courts, therefore, will

"affirm the granting of a motion to compel settlement if the record
establishes a binding agreement and xthe excuse for nonperformance
is comparatively

unsubstantial.'11

Zions

First

Nat'l

Bank v.

Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 479 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (quoting Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co., 592 P.2d at 609).
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32 (1992):
78-51-32.

Authority of attorneys and counselors.

An attorney and counselor has authority:
(1) to execute in the name of his client a bond or other
written instrument necessary and proper for the prosecution of
an action or proceeding about to be or already commenced, or
for the prosecution or defense of any right growing out of an
action, proceeding or final judgment rendered therein.
(2) to bind his client in any of the steps of an action
or proceeding by his agreement filed with the clerk or entered
upon the minutes of the court, and not otherwise.
(3) to receive money claimed by his client in an action
or proceeding during the pendency thereof or after judgment,
unless a revocation of his authority is filed, and, upon
payment thereof and not otherwise, to discharge the claim or
acknowledge satisfaction of the judgment.
Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration:
Rule 4-504.

Written orders, judgments and decrees.

Intent: To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written
orders, judgments, and decrees to the court.
This rule is not
intended to change existing law with respect to the enforceability
of unwritten agreements.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of
record except small claims.

3

Statement of the Rule:
(1)
In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, or within
a shorter time as the court may direct, file with the court a
proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the
court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of
objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five
days after service.
(3)
Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be
reduced to writing and presented to the court for signature within
fifteen days of the settlement and dismissal.
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be
served upon the opposing party and proof of such service shall be
filed with the court.
All judgments, orders, and decrees, or
copies thereof, which are to be transmitted after signature by the
judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be
accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage.
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in
such a manner as to show whether they are entered upon stipulation
of counsel, the motion of counsel or upon the court's own
initiative and shall identify the attorneys of record in the cause
or proceeding in which the judgment, order or decree is made.
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees
shall contain the address or the last known address of the judgment
debtor and the social security number of the judgment debtor if
known.
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate
documents and shall not include any matters by reference unless
otherwise directed by the court. Orders not constituting judgment
or decrees may be made a part of the documents containing the
stipulation or motion upon which the order is based.
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation
shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing,
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and
filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the record.
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written
obligation to pay money and a judgment has previously been rendered
upon the same written obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiff's

4

counsel shall attach to the new complaint a copy of all previous
judgments based upon the same written obligation.
(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the
power of any court, upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement
agreement or any other agreement which has not been reduced to
writing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedure Below.
Plaintiff and appellee, John Deere Company, brought this civil
action against defendants and appellants, A & H Equipment, Inc.,
Wendell Hansen, Mark B. Anderson, and Vada A. Anderson, on June 20,
1989.

(R. 1-105) The trial court, Judge Cullen Y. Christensen of

the Fourth Judicial District Court presiding, entered judgement on
September 21, 1992 in favor of plaintiff on plaintiff's motion to
enforce a settlement agreement purportedly entered into by the
parties.

(R. 370-71).

Defendants appealed this order to the Utah

Supreme Court on September 23, 1992.

(R. 376-77)

The Supreme

Court subsequently poured the case over to the Utah Court of
Appeals for disposition.

(R. 379)

Statement of Facts.
Beginning in 1963, defendants Mark B. Anderson and Vada A.
Anderson established an ongoing franchisor-franchisee relationship
with plaintiff John Deere Co.

(R. 136)

In 1970, plaintiff, the

Andersons, and defendants A & H Equipment and Wendell Hansen reestablished the franchise.

( R. 13 6)

At the inception of the

original 1963 franchise arrangement and, again, with the later
franchise in 1979, plaintiff granted to defendants an exclusive

5

franchise territory covering six counties in Central Utah.
136)

(R.

On June 21, 1983, defendant A & H Equipment, by and through

defendant Wendell Hansen, entered into a series of agreements with
plaintiff in connection with the franchise.

(R. 103-104) Over the

next several years, defendants entered into additional agreements
with plaintiff.

(R. 103-104)

The franchise arrangement also

required defendants to enter into various agreements with an
affiliate of plaintiff, Farm Plan, Inc. (Farm Plan) (R. 398) Farm
Plan, although a separate company from plaintiff, (R. 390), was
directly involved in plaintiff's franchisor-franchisee arrangements
because it is the financing arm of plaintiff, much like G.M.A.C. is
the financing arm for General Motors.

(R. 398)

Because of a series of reverses in defendants7 business,
defendants were unable to pay
plaintiff and Farm Plan.

some of their

(R. 133-136)

obligations to

As a consequence of

defendants7 failure to pay these obligations, some of which were
based upon the same agreements that are exhibits in the present
case, (R. 333), Farm Plan filed suit against A & H Equipment and
Wendell Hansen in a case entitled Farm Plan Corp. v. A & H
Equipment, et al. and Wendell Hansen, Fourth District Court Civil
No. 980400905.
by Kim Wilson.

(R. 333) Farm Plan was represented in this action
(R. 394)

Defendants were not represented in the

Farm Plan action by D. David Lambert, counsel for defendants in the
present action, but entered into a stipulated settlement pro se.
(R. 295-96, 333)
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On June 1, 1989, judgment was entered against defendants in
the amount of $36,062.47 plus interest and costs in the Farm Plan
action. (R. 295-96).

This judgment, which will subsequently be

referred to as the John Deere Farm Plan judgment, was entered
pursuant to Farm Plan's ex parte motion and the stipulation of Farm
Plan and defendants A & H Equipment, Inc. and Wendell Hansen. (R.
295-96, 333)

During the times relevant to the present issues, Mr.

Lambert was unaware of this judgment.

(R. 395)

On June 20, 1989, plaintiff filed the present action against
defendants, alleging that defendants had defaulted on various
obligations under the franchise agreements.

(R. 1-105) Plaintiff

was represented in this action, again, by Kim R. Wilson and also by
Brent Stephens. (R. 105)
Defendants, by and through their counsel in the present
action, Mr. Lambert, answered plaintiff's complaint and filed a
counterclaim which alleged that plaintiff had breached the parties'
franchise agreements on numerous occasions by breaching its promise
of an exclusive franchise territory, and had committed other
tortious acts.

(R. 130-137) The factual circumstances and issues

raised in the counterclaim, including defendants' alleged defaults
oft the franchise agreements and plaintiffs' various tortious
actions alleged by defendants, were the issues underlying not only
the issues raised by plaintiff's complaint, but the Farm Plan
action.

(R. 398)

7

Nearly two years after the initiation of the present lawsuit,
defendants advised Mr. Lambert that they would be willing to
dismiss their counterclaim against John Deere in return for a
complete resolution of all John Deere-related matters.

(R. 333)

Accordingly, on April 10, 1991, Mr. Lambert wrote a letter to John
Deere's counsel and proposed such a settlement. (R. 333)

The

letter referred to the present lawsuit by name and stated, in
relevant part, "I have been asked by my client to propose a
settlement with your client in the above referenced case.

The

settlement proposal is a mutual dismissal with prejudice and a
general release of claims with each party to bear their respective
costs and fees." (R. 315) (Emphasis added.) When he proposed this
settlement by means of this wording, Mr. Lambert's understanding
was that a general release would release all outstanding matters
between the parties, including all outstanding judgments. (R. 395)
Plaintiff's counsel accepted the offer by telephone on April
15, 1991.

(R. 312-13)

Specific terms of the release agreement

were not discussed during this conversation.
22,

1991, plaintiff's

(R. 33 3)

counsel sent a letter

On April

confirming this

conversation, stating, "This will confirm my telephone conversation
of April 15, 1991, in which I accepted your settlement proposal
contained in your letter of April 10, 1991.

I will prepare the

settlement documents and forward them to you for execution." (R.
309)

No specific terms were discussed in this communication

either.
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On May 8, 1991, plaintiffs

counsel sent documents for

signature to Mr. Lambert which purported to settle the dispute.
(R. 3 06)

The documents stated, in part:

IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual dismissal of the
Complaint of John Deere Company (hereinafter the
"Plaintiff") and the Counterclaim of A & H Equipment,
Inc.,, Wendell Hansen, Mark B. Anderson, and Vada A.
Anderson (hereinafter the "Defendants") Plaintiff and
Defendants hereby release and forever discharge the other
from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions,
causes of action or suits of whatever kind or nature,
which now exist or which may hereafter accrue, because
of, arising out of, or in any way connected with that
contractual dispute, the details of which are more fully
set forth in the files and records of the District Court
of Utah County, in that certain action entitled John
Deere Company, plaintiff v. A & H Equipment, Inc. ,
Wendell Hansen, Mark B. Anderson, and Vada A. Anderson,
defendants. Civil No. CV-89-1151, pending in the Fourth
Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah .
(R. 3 06)

The language of this proposed agreement was not the

comprehensive and general release which Mr. Lambert had anticipated
when he proposed the settlement.

(R. 332)

Nevertheless, Mr.

Lambert forwarded the proposed agreement to defendants, who advised
him of their rejection of the agreement because it did not
expressly include the John Deere Farm Plan judgment, and refused to
sign the agreement. (R. 3 32) Mr. Lambert was not aware of the John
Deere Farm Plan judgment until this time. (R. 333)
On July 18, 1991, plaintiff's counsel wrote to Mr. Lambert,
inquiring why defendants had not executed the documents. (R. 3 00)
Mr. Lambert responded by requesting that the documents include the
John Deere Farm Plan obligation in a letter dated July 29, 1991.
(R. 298)

His letter stated:
9

My client is concerned about making sure that the Mutual
Release of All Claims comprehensively releases him from
any obligations to John Deere. Specifically, my client
would like to add John Deere Farm Plan as a releasing
party. Please let me know if that is acceptable so that
we can get this matter finalized.
(R. 298) Shortly thereafter, Kim Wilson telephoned Mr. Lambert and
told him that plaintiff would not agree that the general release of
claims should include the Farm Plan obligation.

(R. 332)

At no time did defendants sign plaintiff's proposed settlement
agreement, nor was the agreement ever filed with the clerk of the
court.
On October 22, 1991, plaintiff brought a motion to enforce its
proposed settlement agreement. (R. 293-94) Defendants responded by
filing

a

cross-motion

to

enforce

their

proposed

settlement

agreement, and requested oral argument. (R. 329-30, 336)
On August 28, 1992, oral arguments were heard on the pending
motions. (R. 361) In its memorandum decision, the court entered an
order

granting

plaintiff's

motion

to

enforce

the

settlement

agreement, denying defendants' motion, and requiring defendants to
execute plaintiff's proposed settlement documents. (R. 3 68-69) The
court entered an order formalizing this decision on September 21,
1992. (R. 371)

Defendants' appeal of this order followed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENFORCING THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT WHEN ITS SPECIFIC TERMS WERE NEVER PROPOSED NOR
AGREED TO BY DEFENDANTS.
A judgment entered to end litigation by consent of the parties

is in the nature of a contract, and the court's authority to
10

approve such an agreement depends upon its validity. To be valid,
such an agreement must have (1) the proper subject matter, (2)
competent parties, (3) the assent or meeting of the minds of the
parties, and (4) consideration.

In the present case, there was no

assent or meeting of the minds of the parties.
For a meeting of the minds to occur, the agreement must embody
a distinct understanding common to both parties, and acceptance
must be unconditional and identical to the offer.

In the present

case, the trial court erred in finding that the parties assented to
plaintiff's proposed agreement because the evidence on the record
shows that defendant's initial offer was all-inclusive; was based
upon all of the issues raised in the complaint and counter claim,
and

did

not

specify

agreement, rather

than

any

limitations;

being

plaintiff's

an unconditional

proposed

acceptance of

plaintiff's offer, was a counter-offer because it proposed terms
that were materially different and more limited than defendants
contemplated; and defendants clearly rejected it.

Because no

meeting of the minds occurred, but an offer and a counter-offer
were made, none of which were accepted, no enforceable agreement
came into being and the trial court erred in summarily enforcing
it.
Further, although counsel may bind a client in procedural
matters arising during the course of the action, only the client
has the authority to settle the action. Accordingly, to the extent
that Mr. Lambert's letter of April 10, 1991 purported to settle
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only the issues raised in plaintiff's complaint, not inclusive of
the John Deere Farm Plan judgment, Mr. Lambert did not have the
apparent or implied authority of defendants to do so, making the
agreement invalid.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENFORCING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
WHEN THE AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY FILED WITH THE
COURT OR ENTERED UPON THE MINUTES OF THE COURT.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32(2) (1992), Rule 4-504(8) of the Code

of Judicial Administration, and Utah case law interpreting these
statutes indicate that enforcement of settlement agreements that
are not made before a court or are written, signed by the parties,
and filed with the clerk of the court, may be found to be valid
only if there are clear indicia on the record that an agreement was
actually made.

Absent such indicia, a court may not enforce a

purported settlement agreement. In the present case, the purported
settlement agreement was not made before the court nor written,
signed by the parties, and filed with the clerk of the court.
Further, the record indicates that the parties never actually made
an agreement because they never agreed upon its specific terms.
Accordingly, the purported settlement agreement is unenforceable
under the intent of these statutes.
III. IF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE, IT WAS ENTERED
INTO BY MISTAKE AND SHOULD BE RESCINDED.
Should this court find that the parties actually entered into
an enforceable settlement agreement, it should also find that the
agreement

is subject to rescission

unilateral mistake of fact.

because of Mr. Lambert's

The record shows that a unilateral
12

mistake of fact occurred because Mr, Lambert was unaware of the
existence of the John Deere Farm Plan judgment until after the
settlement negotiations had begun and defendants had rejected the
terms of plaintiffs7 proposed settlement documents. Because he was
not specifically aware of the judgment, he did not specify it in
his settlement

offer, even though the language he used was

inclusive enough to include it. Rescission should be granted for
this mistake because:

(1) It deprives defendants of their right

and ability to prosecute their counterclaim without giving themthe
benefit they bargained for in making the settlement offer; (2)
inclusion of a release of the John Deere Farm Plan judgment was
material to defendants7

willingness to settle the case; (3)

although Mr. Lambert made reasonable inquiry regarding the facts,
defendants and plaintiff's counsel did not specifically inform him
of the existence of the John Deere Farm Plan judgment until after
negotiations had commenced; and (4) rescission will not prejudice
plaintiff because it will simply be restored to the position of
having to prosecute its complaint.
IV.

IF AN AGREEMENT EXISTED, ITS TERMS WERE AMBIGUOUS AND THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY ENFORCING IT.
The ambiguity of the language in the letter of April 10, 1991,

which proposed a general release of claims, was the subject of oral
argument in the trial court. The trial court erred in interpreting
this letter by: (1) finding there was a meeting of the minds, and
(2)

finding

the

letter

to

be

clear

and

unambiguous.

The

determination of the existence of ambiguity is a question of law,
13

but the interpretation of an ambiguous contract is a question of
fact*

The court stated that it found no ambiguity, but yet, in

making its ruling, it stated that it considered the "posture of the
parties" and the factual background.

The court ruled, however,

without

hearing

conducting

an

evidentiary

on

the

factual

background, and summarily enforced the agreement by motion.

The

trial court committed reversible error by finding the letter to be
unambiguous when it is clear that essential terms were missing and
the letter contemplated a detailed general release agreement, and
in making an essentially factual finding without the benefit of
taking evidence.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENFORCING THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT WHEN ITS SPECIFIC TERMS WERE NEVER PROPOSED NOR
AGREED TO BY DEFENDANTS.
A judgment entered by the consent of the parties to litigation

is "in the nature of a contract approved or adopted by the court,"
and the court's authority to approve such an agreement depends upon
the validity of the agreement. Financial Indemnity Co. v. Bevans,
38 Or. App. 369, 590 P.2d

276, 277-78

(1979).

In Suaarhouse

Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (1980), the Utah
Supreme Court set out the elements essential to the validity of
such an agreement:

"(1) a proper subject matter; (2) competent

parties; (3) an assent or meeting of the minds of the parties; and
(4) a consideration given for the accord."
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In the present case, the core issue is whether the third
element, the existence of an assent or the meeting of the minds of
the parties, has been shown.
indicate that

The record and the relevant law

it has not, thereby making the trial court's

enforcement of the settlement agreement at issue improper.
A.

There Was No Meeting Of The Minds On The Terms Of The
Attempted Settlement Agreement,

For a settlement, which is an agreement to end judicial
proceedings, to be binding and enforceable, there must be a meeting
of the minds as to its terms and conditions.

Recreational

Development Co. of America v. American Construction Co., 749 P.2d
1002, 1005 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).

Thus, the same principles which

apply to contract law apply to determining the validity of a
settlement agreement:
Under basic contract law principles, a contract is not
formed without a meeting of the minds." " [Contractual
mutual assent requires assent by all parties to the same
thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to
all the terms." Determining whether the specific terms
omitted were essential to the agreement requires an
examination of the entire agreement and the circumstances
under which the agreement was entered into.
Crismon v. Western Co. of North America, 742 P.2d 1219, 1221-22
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted) (quoting Oberhansley v.
Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977) and Cessna Fin. Corp. v.
Meyer,

575

P.2d

1048, 1050

(Utah

1978));

accord

John

Call

Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah
1987) .
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For a meeting of the minds to occur, the contract must embody
"a distinct understanding common to both parties."

Gulf Chemical

Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 693 P.2d
1092, 1095 (1984).

Further, "[t]he contract must be specific

enough to show that the parties shared a mutual intent."

Id. "If

contracting parties ascribe different meanings to a material
contract term which is ambiguous, there has been no meeting of the
minds and no valid contract exists." Real Equity Diversification,
Inc. v. Coville, 744 P.2d 756, 758 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
Further, "[i]t is a basic principle of contract law that, in
order to create a contract, an accceptance must be unconditional,
identical to the offer, and must not modify, delete or introduce
any new terms into the offer."
651 P.2d 928, 931 (1982).

Gyurkey v. Babler, 103 Idaho 663,

A purported acceptance which adds a

qualification or requires performance of conditions is not an
acceptance.

Parry v. Walker, 657 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Colo. Ct. App.

1982) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 60). In other
words, if a party proposes a material alteration of the contractual
terms, "the modified offer becomes a counter offer that must be
accepted unconditionally by the original offeror to create a
contract."

Anderson Excavating and Wrecking Co. v. Certified

Welding Corp., 769 P.2d

887, 889

(Wyo. 1988).

"A purported

acceptance that changes the terms of an offer in any material
respect may operate as a counteroffer, but it is not an acceptance
and does not consummate the contract." Northwest Television Club,

16

Inc. v. Gross Seattle, Inc., 26 Wash. App. 11, 612 P.d 422, 426
(1980).
In its minute entry following oral arguments on the summary
enforcement of the purported

settlement agreement, the court

stated,
Based on Mr. Lambert's letter and in reviewing the file,
there was a general release and acceptance of each party.
It appears that pits [sic] Motion to enforce the
stipulation on the basis it resolved all matters with
respect to this case, and there being no dispute, the
motion is therefore granted.
(R. 361) During oral argument, the court stated, "there's nothing
in the record to support the contention that you now assert or that
your client intends to have you assert that he was thinking about
this other case as well." (R. 410)
The evidence on the record which supports this conclusion, and
to which the trial court referred, was Mr. Lambert's letter of
April 10, 1991, which referenced this case, John Deere v. A & H
Equipment, et al, and stated that "I have been asked by my client
to propose a settlement with your client in the above referenced
case. The settlement proposal is a mutual dismissal with prejudice
and general release of claims with each party to bear their
respective costs and fees." (R. 315) (Emphasis added.)

Also, the

record shows that the John Deere Farm Plan judgment arose from a
separate action entitled Farm Plan Corp. v. A & H Equipment, Inc.
and Wendell Hansen.
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There is no other evidence on the record which specifically
supports the trial court's conclusion, but there is substantial
evidence on the record to lead one to the opposite conclusion.
The record indicates that defendants, through Mr. Lambert,
intended to make a general and inclusive resolution of all issues
included in the present case, including the issues raised in
plaintiff's
counterclaim.

complaint

and

the

issues

raised

in defendants'

Defendants' counterclaim not only included issues

raised in opposition to plaintiff's complaint but referred to to
circumstances and facts and incorporated agreements underlying the
Farm Plan action.

Thus, some of the facts and issues underlying

the John Deere Farm Plan judgment were raised in plaintiff's
counterclaim, and arose out of the same nucleus of operative fact
as the issues raised in plaintiff's complaint. Further, plaintiff
and Farm Plan, although nominally separate corporations, were
intrinsically functionally related in making business arrangements
with defendant because Farm Plan is plaintiff's financing arm
through which plaintiff organizes and finances its dealership
arrangements with persons such as defendants, much like GMAC is to
General Motors.

Finally, lead counsel for plaintiffs was also

counsel for Farm Plan in the Farm Plan lawsuit, and was very
familiar with the issues underlying both lawsuits and the existence
of the John Deere Farm Plan judgment.

Plaintiff, accordingly,

should have reasonably understood the general and inclusive wording
of defendants' offer to include the resolution of all underlying
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issues, obligations and concerns relating to defendants' franchise
relationship, including the John Deere Farm Plan judgment.
Plaintiff responded to defendant's offer of settlement by a
telephone call and a letter, in which no terms were discussed or
defined, and by writing
unilaterally

provided

a settlement

terms

limiting

agreement by which it
the proposed

settlement

agreement to a release of only those claims made in the present
action.

The record indicates that the parties did not propose

terms that had a distinct and common understanding.

Because the

wording on the settlement agreement provided by plaintiffs did not
correspond with the defendants7intent in making a general release,
but substantially limited the scope of the release, plaintiff's
proposed settlement agreement constituted a rejection of the terms
offered by defendant and, accordingly, constituted a counter-offer
rather than an acceptance.

When informed of the terms offered by

plaintiff, defendants rejected

them and refused

to sign the

settlement agreement. Mr. Lambert, by his letter of July 29, 1991,
clearly conveyed defendant's rejection of plaintiff's proposed
terms and the grounds for their rejection to plaintiffs.

Mr.

Lambert, in this letter, attempted further negotiations as to the
terms

of

the

agreement,

which

were

rejected

by

plaintiff.

Accordingly, there was no meeting of the minds on the terms of the
proposed settlement agreement, but only an offer and a counteroffer.

No enforceable contract came into existence.
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The Utah Court of Appeals considered a similar situation in
Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), which case the
trial court stated, in its verbal ruling, to be controlling of the
outcome of this case, but did not follow.

In Brown, the parties,

a divorcing husband and wife, engaged in settlement negotiations,
over a fifteen-month period, regarding the amount of child support
and alimony.

Mr. Brown's counsel caused Mrs. Brown's counsel to

believe that the issues had been resolved and that the time which
had been scheduled for the parties' depositions could be used to
record a settlement agreement.

The parties and their respective

counsel met on the scheduled date.

The proposed

settlement

agreement reduced the amount of alimony and increased the amount of
child support due to Mrs. Brown.

During the negotiations, both

counsel and Mr. Brown spoke, but Mrs. Brown said nothing.

After

the purported agreement was reduced to writing and sent to Mrs.
Brown, she rejected it, believing it to be unfair.

Subsequently,

Mr. Brown filed a motion for an order approving and enforcing the
settlement agreement. Id. at 3 34. Mrs. Brown opposed this motion
with an affidavit, indicating that:
[H]er former counsel had assured her that increases in
alimony and child support were justified and that he was
confident she would win major increases in both; that she
was unaware of the tenor of the proposed settlement
agreement until the day scheduled for her deposition;
that her former counsel informed her that he told
opposing counsel that she would agree to the settlement,
that she was "shocked, dismayed, dissapointed [sic], and
confused" by her counsel's change in position; that she
didn't recall speaking at the proceeding; and that she
refused to sign the written agreement.
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Id. The Utah Court of Appeals held that, because the agreement had
not been made in court and because Mrs. Brown did not assent, at
any time, to the terms of the agreement, the stipulation was not
binding.

Id.

The Utah Court reasoned, "[b]asic to a valid

stipulation is a meeting of the minds of those involved.

The

parties must have completed their negotiations either in person or
through their attorneys acting within the rules of agency," and
that because Mrs. Brown had not assented to the stipulation but
remained silent, and that silence could not be construed to be
assent under the circumstances, the stipulation was not binding.
Id. at 335.
Brown

is

virtually

indistinguishable

from

the

present

situation. Like Mrs. Brown, defendants did not assent to the terms
of the settlement agreement proposed by plaintiff and, unlike Mrs.
Brown, defendants clearly indicated their non-acceptance of the
agreement. Accordingly, to be consistent with the principle of law
outlined in Brown, this court should find that the parties did not
enter into an enforceable agreement because defendants did not
assent to the materially different terms proposed by plaintiff.
The Utah Supreme Court, in contrast, in Murray v. State. 737
P.2d

1000 (Utah 1987), affirmed the summary enforcement of a

settlement agreement where where the offer had been made by the
State

in writing and confirmed

by a telephone conversation,

plaintiff's attorney informed the State that he had discussed the
offer with the plaintiffs and they had accepted it, the State's

21

counsel forwarded a release and a check for the amount offered to
the plaintiff's attorney and, thereafter, the plaintiff changed her
mind and would not sign the release.

The Murray court noted that

"[pjlaintiffs have not at any time argued that an agreement was not
reached and, in fact, at oral argument, conceded such agreement.
There appears to be no reason for noncompliance with the settlement
other than [the plaintiff's] change of mind." Murray. 737 P.2d at
1001. This opinion underlines the pertinent rule of law: Where a
meeting of the minds has occurred, a settlement agreement is
enforceable; where there has not been a meeting of the minds, a
settlement agreement is unenforceable.
Likewise, the Utah Court, in Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v.
Travelstead. 592 P.2d 605 (Utah 1979), held that a settlement
agreeement was enforceable, even though not ratified by the court
before enforcement was sought, because there was substantial and
sufficient evidence to show that the parties had, in fact, entered
into an enforceable agreement.

Id. at 608.

Nevertheless, the

court observed that:
[I]t is apparent that the summary procedure for
enforcement of unperformed settlement contracts is not a
panacea for the myriad types of problems that may arise.
The summary procedure is admirably suited to situations
where, for example, a binding settlement bargain is
conceded or shown, and the excuse for nonperformance is
comparatively unsubstantial. On the other hand, it is
ill suited to situations presenting complex factual
issues related either to the formation or the
consummation of the contract, which only testimonial
exploration in a more plenary proceeding is apt to
satisfactorily resolve.
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Id at 607 (quoting Autera v. Robinson, 13 6 U.S. App. D. C. 216, 419
F.2d 1197, 1200 (1969)).
The present situation is distinguishable from both Murray and
Tracy Collins Bank & Trust because, in both cases, there was no
question that an agreement had been reached, while the predominant
dispute in this case is whether an agreement ever came into being.
The Utah Court of Appeals, in Zions First Nat'l Bank v.
Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 480 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), affirmed the summary enforcement of a settlement agreement
where the defendants did not clearly express their intention not to
settle the dispute on the proposed terms.

The court stated that

the defendants "would have been in a position to defeat summary
enforcement of the settlement through an affidavit identifying the
specific statements and actions they had taken to communicate to
Zions their decision not to accept the settlement offer at that
time," if they had clearly expressed their intention during the
settlement conference.

Id.

Barbara Jensen Interiors does not

represent an applicable precedent for resolution of the present
case because defendants, through Mr. Lambert, not only clearly
communicated their rejection of the terms proposed by plaintiff in
his letter of July 29, 1991, but Mr. Lambert provided an affidavit
to this effect to the trial court.
Other jurisdictions have upheld the same principle of law.
For example, the Wyoming Court found that there was no meeting of
the minds and, therefore, no contract, where the plaintiff sent a
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lease agreement to the defendant, who reviewed it and called
plaintiff to discuss the terms, and then altered the document to
reflect the negotiated changes, initialled the changes, signed the
document, and returned it to the plaintiff.

Anderson Excavating

and Wrecking Co. , 769 P. 2d at 889. Similarly, the New Mexico Court
overturned an order of dismissal that rested upon a release, in
which counsel for one party drew up a stipulation for dismissal and
submitted

it to

counsel

for

the

other

party,

who

added

a

significant additional term to agreement which counsel for the
first party rejected.

Fratello v. Socorro Electric Cooperative,

107 N.M. 378, 758 P.2d 792, 795 (N.M. 1988).

The Fratello court

reasoned that there was no unconditional acceptance of the offer of
settlement because of the addition of the significant additional
term to the offer.
at 278.

Id.; accord Financial Indemnity Co., 590 P.2d

Likewise, the Colorado Supreme Court, in H.W. Houston

Construction Co. v. District Court, 632 P.2d 563 (Colo. 1981),
found that a settlement agreement was not reached under the
following circumstances: The corporate plaintiff, whose truck had
been damaged and whose driver had been severely injured in an
accident caused by defendant, stipulated the amount of property
damage to plaintiffs during a pre-trial conference.

Some time

later, the parties' attorneys reached a compromise and settlement
agreement.

The defendants each tendered a check to the plaintiff

in the aggregate amount of the stipulated property damage, along
with a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice and a general

24

release from all liability.

The plaintiff's attorney refused to

execute the stipulations and informed his client that he would not
allow it to accept the settlement because he had understood the
settlement agreement to be for the amount of property damage only
and not for the injuries to the driver.

The plaintiff's attorney

offered to accept the tendered checks in full settlement of the
plaintiff's claim for property damage or to return the checks and
go to trial on both issues.

The defendants rejected plaintiff's

offers, preferring instead to attempt to enforce the alleged
agreement.

Id. at 564-65.

The court found that "the parties in

this case never reached an understanding which could be the basis
of a binding compromise and settlement," and, therefore, there was
no enforceable contract.

Id. at 565.

The present case is similar to these cases because the parties
never achieved a meeting of the minds on material issues.

The

record indicates only a series of offers, counter-offers, and
negotiations, with no agreement on specific terms.

Accordingly,

this Court should find that no enforceable contract exists or ever
did, and the trial court erred so finding and summarily enforcing
the settlement offer proposed by the plaintiff.
B.

Mr. Lambert Did Not Have Authority To Settle The Lawsuit
On Terms Different Than Those Agreed To By Defendants.

Mr.

Lambert,

counsel

for defendants, did

not have the

authority to settle the lawsuit on terms different than those
agreed to by defendants. It is a well-settled rule of law that an
"attorney is authorized by virtue of his employment to bind the
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client in procedural matters arising during the course of the
action," but is not authorized, "merely by virtue of his retention
in litigation, to ximpair the client's substantial rights or the
causes of action itself.'"

Blanton v. Womancare Inc., 38 Cal. 3d

396, 696 P.2d 645, 650, 212 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1985) (quoting Linsk v.
Linsk, 70 Cal. 2d 272, 449 P.2d 760, 74 Cal. Rptr 544 (1969)).
Thus, "an attorney ordinarily has no apparent authority to settle
his client's action without the client's consent." Miotk v. Rudy,
227 Kan. 296, 605 P.2d 587, 591 (1980).

With respect to this

issue, the Kansas court approved the following language from Reimer
v. Davis, 224 Kan. 25, 580 P.2d 81, 85 (1978):
We have previously considered the nature and extent of an
attorney's authority in handling a client's case. It has
been recognized generally that a client is bound by the
appearance, admissions, and actions of counsel acting on
behalf of his client. The rule is limited, however, to
control over procedural matters incident to litigation.
The client has control over the subject matter of
litigation. An attorney has no authority to compromise
or settle his client's claim without his client's
approval.
Miotk, 605 P.2d at 590 (citations omitted).

Accordingly, for an

attorney to bind a client to a settlement agreement, "he must have
specific authority to do so, unless there is an emergency or some
overriding

reason

for

enforcing

the

attorney's lack of specific authority."
524, 591 P.2d 278, 280 (1979).

settlement

despite

the

Bolles v. Smith, 92 N.M.

An attorney's authority is not

enlarged simply because the contract is entered into in conjunction
with pending litigation.

Blanton, 696 P.2d at 652.
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In the present case, the agreement at issue is not procedural;
it relates to the dismissal of both parties' claims against the
other.

Thus, the parties, themselves, must approve the terms of

any agreement; absent the parties' express approval of the terms,
counsel for the parties do not have authority to enter into the
agreement.

Defendants only authorized Mr. Lambert to settle the

entire claim, not the limited issues to which plaintiff wished to
restrict the settlement agreement.

Defendants did not authorize

Mr. Lambert to enter into an agreement settling less than all of
the issues involved, including issues relating to the Farm Plan
action which they raised in their counterclaim.

Accordingly, to

the extent that Mr. Lambert's letter of April 10, 1991 purported to
propose settlement terms limiting the settlement to only those
issues and obligations raised in plaintiff's complaint, Mr. Lambert
did not have actual or apparent authority to accept plaintiff's
settlement terms and acted rightly in refusing to do so.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENFORCING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
WHEN THE AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY PILED WITH THE
COURT OR ENTERED UPON THE MINUTES OF THE COURT.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32 (1992) , provides, in relevant part:
An attorney and counselor has authority:
• • •

(2) to bind his client in any of the steps of an
action or proceeding by his agreement filed with the
clerk and entered upon the minutes of the court, and not
otherwise.
This language is echoed by Rule 4-504(8) of the Code of
Judicial Administration, which states:
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No orders, judgments or decrees based upon stipulation
shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in
writing, signed by the attorneys of record for the
respective parties and filed with the clerk or the
stipulation was made on the record.
Judge Davidson, in his concurrence to Zions First Nat 7 ! Bank v.
Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), states that Rule 4-504(8) was "formerly a rule of practice
in the courts and was therefore not afforded the full enforcement
of a rule of civil procedure," but that because it "has now been
elevated into the Code of Judicial Administration, it is now
entitled to enforcement equal to that given other rules."
The language of these rules indicates that, for a stipulation
to be binding on the parties, it should be written, signed, and
filed with the clerk, or entered into in court.

This rule is

somewhat flexible in the case of settlement stipulations because of
the limiting language contained in Rule 4-504(10) of the Rules of
Judicial Administration, which states that "[n]othing in this rule
shall be construed to limit the power of any court, upon a proper
showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any other agreement
which has not been reduced to writing"; however, that flexibility
does not extend to a situation where it is clear that a written
agreement was contemplated by the parties.
The Utah Courts have interpreted the intent of these rules to
allow enforcement of oral settlement agreements, provided that
there are clear indicia on the record that an agreement was
actually made.

Absent a clear finding that the parties actually
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entered into a valid settlement agreement, such a stipulation would
have to have been entered into before the court or be in writing,
signed by the parties and/or their counsel, and be filed with the
clerk of the court to be binding.
Judge Bench, in his concurring and dissenting opinion to Zions
First Nat'l Bank v, Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), succinctly set forth this rule:
In Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah Ct. App.
1987), this court aplied the predecessor to rule 4-504(8)
and expressly held that settlement agreements must be in
the form of a written stipulation to be enforceable. I
believe Brown is indistinguishable from the instant case.
The only exception to the rule that settlement
agreements must be in writing is where the parties
concede the existence of an agreement. Throughout the
instant case, the Jensens have consistently denied that
an agreement was ever reached.
In view of the clear language of rule 4-504(8) and
our decision in Brown, I would reverse the order
compelling settlement and remand the case for trial.
Id. at 481-82 (citations omitted).
As discussed above, the court in Brown v. Brown, 744 P. 2d 333,
335 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) , held that, because the Browns' agreement
had not been made in court and because Mrs. Brown did not assent,
at any time, to the terms of the agreement, the stipulation the
parties entered into to settle child support and alimony issues was
not binding.

Id. at 3 35.

The Brown court stated:

For a stipulation to be binding, agreement by the parties
must be evidenced by a signed writing which would satisfy
the Statute of Frauds, or the agreement must be stated in
court on the record before a judge. The facts in this
case do not show such evidence. Therefore, there was no
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stipulation reached between the parties and there is
nothing for the court to enforce.
Brown, 744 P.2d at 335.

This rule is directly applicable to the present case. In the
present case, the alleged settlement agreement was not entered into
before the court and is not on the record; and has not been
evidenced by a writing, signed by the parties or their counsel, and
filed with the clerk of the court. Thus, for this agreement to be
binding, there must be substantial evidence that an agreement was
actually reached.
actually

reached,

The record indicates that no agreement was
making

the

present

situation

virtually

indistinguishable from that in Brown. and the reasoning outlined by
Judge Bench in Barbara Jensen Interiors applicable.
In conclusion, § 78-51-32(2) and Rule 4-504(8), and the case
law interpreting these statutes, compel the conclusion that the
proposed settlement agreement is unenforceable. Accordingly, this
Court should find that the trial court erred in summarily enforcing
the proposed settlement agreement.
III. IP THE AGREEMENT WAS ENFORCEABLE, IT WAS ENTERED INTO BY
MISTAKE AND SHOULD BE FOUND TO BE VOID.
In the event that this court should find the settlement
agreement at issue to be enforceable, the trial court's ruling that
it is a valid settlement agreement should still be reversed because
it was entered into as the result of a unilateral mistake.
In B & A Assocs. v. L.A. Young Sons Constr. Co., 796 P.2d 692
(Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court delineated the elements of
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mutual mistake of fact sufficient to make an otherwise valid
contract unenforceable, as follows:
1.
The mistake must be of so grave a consequence
that to enforce the contract as actually made would be
unconscionable.
2.
The matter as to which the mistake was made
must relate to a material feature of the contract.
3.
Generally the mistake must have occurred
notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the
party making the mistake.
4.
It must be possible to give relief by way of
rescission without serious prejudice to the other party
except the loss of the bargain. In other words, it must
be possible to put him in status quo.
Id. at 695 (quoting John Call Engineering, 743 P.2d at 1209-10)).
Although defendants knew about this judgment and clearly
intended to settle not only the issues raised in plaintiff's
complaint but also the John Deere Farm Plan judgment, their
counsel, Mr. Lambert, was not involved in the Farm Plan case and
was unaware of the existence of the John Deere Farm Plan judgment
until

after

the

settlement

negotiations

culminating

purported settlement agreement had been initiated.

in

the

In contrast,

plaintiff and Farm Plan, the affiliated financing arm of plaintiff
through whose instrumentality plaintiff established farm equipment
dealerships, were well aware of the judgment based upon Farm Plan's
claims, and the underlying circumstances for the issues defendants
addressed in their counterclaim.

Not only was plaintiff aware of

the Farm Plan judgment, plaintiff's counsel, Kim Wilson, was also
aware of the judgment, having also served as counsel on the Farm
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Plan case.

Thus, even though defendant's counsel was unaware of

the judgment, plaintiff was aware, making it a unilateral mistake.
As a consequence, Mr. Lambert did not explictly know about the
judgment in the Farm Plan case on April 10, 1991, so was not able
to specify, in his letter of April 10, 1991, that defendants'
settlement offer included and was conditioned upon the release of
all claims between these parties.
The facts of the present case satisfy the elements set forth
in B & A Assocs.
First, the mistake is so grave as to make the contract, as
made, unconscionable.

If this settlement agreement is enforced,

defendants will have lost the right to litigate the claims set
forth in their counterclaim and will also have lost the benefit of
the bargain which they intended to make, namely, to dismiss their
obligation on the John Deere Farm Plan judgment.

This is serious

enough to render the enforcement of the bargain unconscionable
because defendants will have given up something of value, their
right to pursue their counterclaim without receiving the benefit of
the bargain they were willing to make.
Second, the matter relates to a material feature of the
contract.

Defendants'counterclaims were related, in part, to the

circumstances

underlying

the

judgment

circumstances underlying the complaint.

and,

in

part, to the

Absent dismissal of all

the issues related to this litigation, including the judgment,
defendants

would

not

have

been

32

willing

to

dismiss

their

counterclaim, making the mistake of fact highy material to the
agreement•
Third, the mistake occurred despite Mr. Lambert's ordinary
diligence.

Because Mr. Lambert had not been involved in the John

Deere Farm Plan judgment, he was not aware of it and would not have
been aware of it in the course of pursuing the present action.
Finally, it is possible to give relief to defendants without
unduly prejudicing plaintiff. If the settlement agreement is found
to be unenforceable, the only result is that plaintiffs will have
to litigate their lawsuit.

It is universally held that a party is

not prejudiced by being forced to litigate its own lawsuit.
Rescission of the purported settlement agreement will serve to
simply place the parties in status quo, in the exact position they
would have been in absent the purported settlement agreement.
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that "[w]hen one party's
mistake of fact is coupled with knowledge of the mistake by the
other party or a mistake is produced by fraud or other inequitable
conduct by the nonerring party, the mistake provides a basis for
reformation or rescission."

B & A Assocs. , 796 P. 2d at 696.

Indeed, reformation or rescission may be available "where, unknown
to one of the parties, an instrument contains a mistake rendering
it at variance with the prior understanding and agreement of the
parties, and the other party learns of the mistake at the time of
the execution of the instrument and later seeks to take advantage
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of it."

Id. (quoting Spirt v. Albert, 109 Conn. 292, 146 A. 717,

720 (1929)).
This principle of law is applicable to the present case.
Plaintiff was well aware of the existence of the Farm Plan
judgment, the underlying facts, and the fact that defendants
probably

intended to include this judgment in the settlement

agreement.

Mr. Lambert did not know about it.

Plaintiff now

seeks, because Mr. Lambert did not specifically identify this
judgment in the language of his letcer, to take advantage of this
situation and to maintain that defendants did not mean to include
it in the agreement.

In the words of Fogdall v. Lewis & Clark

College, 38 Or. App. 541, 590 P.2d 775, 779 (1979) (quoting Klimek
v. Perisch, 231 Or. 71, 371 P.2d 956, 958 (1962)), "x[ri]either
party to a contract may assume that a contract exists if he knows
that the other party does not intend what his words or actions may
seem to express.'" Accordingly, defendants should not be bound by
the contract that plaintiff sought to make, in light of plaintiff's
knowledge of the underlying factual situation and Mr. Lambert's
mistake of fact.
IV.

IF AN AGREEMENT EXISTED, ITS TERMS WERE AMBIGUOUS AND THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY ENFORCING IT.
The clarity or ambiguity of the language in the letter of

April 10, 1991, which proposed a "general release of claims" was
the subject of oral argument in the trial court below.
court's ruled verbally from the bench, stating:
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The trial

And based on the letter, your letter, and in view of the
pleadings in this case, which I have reviewed, and the
posture of these parties, it appears evident to the Court
that the only thing that reasonably could have been
contemplated is that it involved a general release of
claims of each party with respect to the matter that is
pending before the Court in this action.
(R. 412)
The trial court erred in its interpretation of the letter
which proposed a settlement with plaintiff. First, the court erred
in finding that there was a meeting of the minds, which issue has
been fully discussed in Point I above. Second, the court erred, as
a matter of law, in its interpretation of the letter.

If the

language of the April 10, 1991 letter was clear and unambiguous,
the court need not have considered the "posture of these parties"
in order to interpret it.

Once the court began to consider the

"posture of these parties," it was incumbent upon the court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on the factual background rather
than summarily enforce the agreement by motion.

The letter of

April 10, 1991, stated, "I have been asked by my client to propose
a settlement with your client in the above-referenced case.

The

settlement proposal is a mutual dismissal with prejudice and a
general release of claims with each party to bear their respective
costs and fees."
The

letter

significance:

(R. 315)
contemplates

two

separate

acts

of

legal

The dismissal of the case and, conjunctively, an

agreement for the release of all claims between these parties. It
is also clear that two separate documents were to be prepared to
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set forth a stipulation for dismissal of the pending action and to
memorialize the "general release of claims" which were outstanding
between the parties.

It is customary in such releases that the

claims being released will be described in excruciating detail.
Such documents as prepared by plaintiff's counsel, contained terms
therein or omitted terms therefrom which were material to the
defendants

and

made

the

proposed

documents

unacceptable

to

defendants.
As a general rule in the Utah courts, "[l]anguage in a written
document is ambiguous if the words may be understood to support two
or more plausible meanings.

A court is justified in determining

that a contract or order is ambiguous if its terms are either
unclear or missing."

Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 60

(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
determination

of whether

an

ambiguity

exists

in

The

contractual

language is a legal determination for the court and, on appeal, is
not entitled to deference.

Id.

Similarly, in the absence of

ambiguity, construction of a written document is a question of law
not entitled to deference by the appellate court.

Terry v. Price

Municipal Corp., 784 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989).
In the present case, because

it is clear

that

further

documentation of the agreement was required and was, in fact,
prepared, the agreement, if any, was, by definition, ambiguous
because material terms were missing. Plaintiff has argued that the
language of the letter restricts the offer to a settlement of only
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those issues and obligations raised in its complaint.

Defendants

argue, in contrast, that the wording of the offer is sufficiently
general as to contemplate a global release of claims.

The record

also indicates that there was no distinct or definite understanding
reached by the parties at to the exact meaning of the language.
Because this language, therefore, is subject to at least two
plausible meanings, it is ambiguous.

Accordingly, parol evidence

as to the partial intent should have been taken by the trial court
in seeking to interpret this language.
These parties had a lengthy history of dealings with numerous
contracts directly with John Deere and with John Deere affiliates.
Construction of an agreement in such a case is a question of fact
and parol evidence may be used in arriving at an interpretation.
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112,
1118 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

This court has noted that:

[I]t is a fundamental rule that in the construction of
contracts the courts may look not only to the language
employed but to the subject matter and the surrounding
circumstances, and may avail themselves of the same light
which the parties possessed when the contract was made.
To ascertain that intention, regard must be had to the
nature of the instrument itself, the condition of the
parties executing it, and the objects which they had in
view.
In the present case, the trial court made no findings.

The

court took no evidence other than to consider the affidavit
submitted by defendants' counsel. The trial court did not resolve
this essentially factual issue by recieving evidence, but summarily
decided the issue based only upon the memoranda and oral arguments
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of the respective counsel. The trial court's action in failing to
take evidence on an issue of fact is reversible error. This court,
therefore, should reverse the trial court's summary enforcement of
the proposed settlement agreement and remand for trial.
CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully request that this Court find that the
trial court erred in summarily enforcing plaintiff's proposed
settlement order, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand
the case to the trial court for trial.
DATED this

day of January 1993.

D. DAVID LAMBERT a.v@

LINDA J. BARCLAY for
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this I °[^\\
January, 1993.
R. Brent Stephens
Ryan E. Tibbits
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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U

day of

^ 'CO
'**

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

^>

''/i
^

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN DEERE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER:

CV 89 1151

vs.

DATE: August 28, 1992

A & H EQUIPMENT, INC. et al

CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE

Defendant.

Rept: Vonda Bassett, CSR

ORAL ARGUMENTS
This was the time set for hearing oral arguments on
pending motions. R. Brent Stephens appeared as counsel for the
plaintiff and D. David Lambert as counsel for the defendant.
Mr. Stephens addressed the Court anb argued the Motion
to enforce Settlement Agreement.
Mr. lambert responded. Background of the case reviewed
for the Court.
Mr. Stephen argued on rebuttal. Matter submitted.
The Court, in looking at the Brown Case, is bound by the
majority ruling. Matter discussed.
Based on Mr. Lambert's letter and in reviewing the file,
there was a general release and acceptance of each party. It
appears that pits Motion to enforce the stipulation on the basis
it resolved all matters with respect to this case, and there being
no dispute, the motion is therefore granted.
Mr. Stephens to prepare the Order, submit to Mr. Lambert
to approve as to form and file same with the Court for signing and
filing.

<?/

fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, Stau ^ Utah

CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk
V*
R. BRENT STEPHENS ( A 3 0 9 8 )
KIM R. WILSON ( A 3 5 1 2 )

'

"

Deputy
~~

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN DEERE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.

A & H EQUIPMENT, INC., WENDELL
HANSEN, MARK B. ANDERSON, and
VADA A. ANDERSON,

Civil No. CV-89-1151
Judge Cullen Y. Christensen

Defendants.

Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and
defendants' cross-motion to enforce settlement agreement came on
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen
on August 28, 1992, at 3:00 p.m.

Plaintiff was represented by

its counsel R. Brent Stephens of the law firm of Snow,
christensen & Martineau, and defendants were represented by their
counsel D. David Lambert of the law firm of Howard, Lewis &
Petersen.
The Court reviewed the submissions and memoranda and
affidavit submitted by the parties, and the court heard oral

argument. After being fully apprised, the Court hereby orders
the following:
1.

Plaintiff1s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is

hereby granted.
2.

Defendants1 Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is

hereby denied.
3.

This action is settled upon the following terms and

conditions:
a.

A Stipulation, Motion and Judgment of

Dismissal with prejudice as to the Complaint and
Counterclaim will be signed by counsel and presented to
the Court in the form attached hereto as Exhibit ,fA.,f
b.

The Mutual Release of All Claims attached

hereto as Exhibit ,fBff is hereby declared in full force
and effect as though executed by all of the defendants.
DATED this

day of September, 1992.
BY

THE

C O U R T :

IISTENSEN

District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

21\RBS\12976.0G4\Settlementv0i

**££

FILED

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State .J Jtah

CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk
R. BRENT STEPHENS (A3098)

1$

KIM R. WILSON (A3512)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

"

.Deputy

~

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN DEERE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL

VS.

A & H EQUIPMENT, INC., WENDELL
HANSEN, MARK B. ANDERSON, and
VADA A. ANDERSON,

Civil No. CV-89-1151
Judge Cullen Y. Christensen

Defendants.

Based upon the Stipulation and Motion of the parties, and
good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint and defendants'
Counterclaim be and hereby are dismissed with prejudice, and upon
the merits, with each party to bear their own costs and
attorneys' fees.
DATED this

day of September, 1992.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss,
)

Cynthia Northstrom, being duly sworn, says that she is
employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for plaintiff herein; that she served the attached
proposed JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL (Case Number CV-89-1151, Fourth
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah)
upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy
thereof in an envelope addressed to:
D. David Lambert, Esq.
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
Post Office Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the

M ^ 1 day of September, 1992.

\A*in^ yl(toti£ii$rKj>
thia Norqhstrom
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN tO

re me

day of

September, 1992.
NOTARt PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah
My Commission Expires:

2 -3A -<?4

NOTARY PUBLIC
LYNETTE FARMER
10 Exchange Pf ace
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
My Commission Expires
August 24,1994

STATE OP UTAH

HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
Jackson Howard
S. Rex Lewis
Don R. Petersen
Craig M. Snyder
John L. Valentine
D. David Lambert
Fred D. Howard
Leslie W. Slaugh
Kevin J. Suttcrficid
F. Richards Smith, m
Linda J. Barclay

120 East 300 North Street
Post Office Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603

April 10, 1991

Area Code 801
Telephone 373-6345
Teiefiix 377-4991
P:A&HEQUIP.DDL
Our File No. 19,456

R. Brent Stephens, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Re: John Deere v. A & H Equipment, et al.
Dear Brent:
I have been asked by my client to propose a settlement with your client in the above
referenced case. The settlement proposal is a mutual dismissal with prejudice and general
release of claims with each party to bear their respective costs and fees.
As you may know, the defendants have been involved in other litigation and have
generally suffered serious financial reversals. I have evaluated the position of my clients and
I believe that they have everything to gain by going forward with the litigation on the
counterclaim and little or nothing to lose because they could not respond to a judgment if you
were to obtain one.
If this proposal is unacceptable, I need to immediately schedule a time to review your
document production and dates for depositions. If I do not have your response by April 22*
1991, I will proceed with discovery scheduling.
Respectfully,
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN

D. David Lamb

cc: A & H Equipment

MUTUAL RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS
IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual dismissal of the Complaint of John Deere
Company (hereinafter the "Plaintiff") and the Counterclaim of A 4 H Equipment,
I n c . , Wendell Hansen, Mark B - Anderson, and Vada A. Anderson (hereinafter the
"Defendants") Plaintiff and Defendants hereby release and forever discharge the
other from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or
suits of whatever kind or n a t u r e , which now exist of which may hereafter accrue,
because of, for, arising out of or in any way connected with that contractual
dispute, the details of which are more fully set forth in the files and records of
the District Court of Utah County, in that certain action entitled John Deere
Company, plaintiff v . A & H Equipment, I n c . , Wendell Hansen, Mark B. Anderson,
and Vada A. Anderson, defendants, Civil No. CV-89-1151, pending in the Fourth
Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah.
The Settling Parties understand and agree that this is a release of all claims
and includes but is not limited to contractual claims and profits, claims for damages
and claims for both direct and consequential damages of any and all kind or
character.
The Settling Parties understand and agree that this settlement is made for
the purpose of compromising a disputed claim and shall not be construed as an
admission of liability, since any liability is expressly denied.
This Release of All Claims may be executed in counterparts.
JOHN DEERE COMPANY

Dated

By
Its
A & H EQUIPMENT

Dated

By
Its

Dated
WENDELL HANSEN

Dated
MARK B. ANDERSON

Dated
VADA A. ANDERSON
21\RBS\12976.0<M Release

